Information Operations has become a controversial subject in the US Army. Whether due to ignorance of actual employment techniques or reluctance to rely on non-tangible means, information operations are often only a “check the block” consideration for military planners. Emerging US Army doctrine emphasizes the use of information operations, stating that in some situations they can be decisive operations. This monograph examines two historical examples of modern warfare for the possible application of modern information operation (IO) principles. The information operations principles found in Student Text 3-0, Operations (destined to become Field Manual 3-0, Operations), are used as evaluation criteria to determine if modern principles were applied in past campaign plans. Significant and relevant issues from these case studies suggest there are a variety of employment methods for information operations. The purpose of this monograph is to increase the knowledge, understanding and applications of IO concepts through the examination of two case studies of modern warfare. These case studies demonstrate that IO principles have been part of modern US military art since the mid nineteenth century. In studying past conflicts a greater understanding can be gained by future military planners of the use of IO.
"The advent of battlefield digitization increases the work trainers for live force-on-force exercises must do to control exercises and provide feedback to units, and it will pull trainers at platoon and company level out of the tactical information loop. The goal of this study was to describe instrumentation capabilities with the potential for reducing workloads and pulling trainers back into the information loop for exercises at the Army's maneuver combat training centers (CTCs) and at home stations. This study documents the experiences of approximately seventy of the National Training Center (NTC) observer/controllers (OCs) and analysts that participated in the training of the Army's first digitized brigade during the Force XXI Army warfighting Experiment (AWE). To gain a better understanding of what is required to support digital training, the study team reviewed emerging tactical doctrine from platoon through battalion task force level to develop a sample of potential digital training points and then designed displays that would help a trainer monitor unit performance with respect to these points. The team then defined the capabilities a workstation would need to create these displays. This report describes, defends and illustrates twenty workstation capabilities that support exercise control and feedback for digitized units."--DTIC.
USAF commanders are looking for better ways to use the global information environment to win the hearts and minds of Muslim populations and retain the goodwill of traditional allies. Their efforts occur against a backdrop of individuals who advocate the integration of public affairs and information operations and those who argue for their separation. As the public face of our joint forces, public affairs cannot thrive unless it is integrated with all core operational capabilities, including information operations.
Cyberspace is one of the major bases of the economic development of industrialized societies and developing. The dependence of modern society in this technological area is also one of its vulnerabilities. Cyberspace allows new power policy and strategy, broadens the scope of the actors of the conflict by offering to both state and non-state new weapons, new ways of offensive and defensive operations. This book deals with the concept of "information war", covering its development over the last two decades and seeks to answer the following questions: is the control of the information space really possible remains or she a utopia? What power would confer such control, what are the benefits?
"In the U.S. Army as elsewhere, transmission of digitized packets on Internet-protocol and space-based networks is rapidly supplanting the use of old technology (e.g., dedicated analog channels) when it comes to information sharing and media broadcasting. As the Army moves forward with these changes, it will be important to identify the implications and potential boundaries of cyberspace operations. An examination of network operations, information operations, and the more focused areas of electronic warfare, signals intelligence, electromagnetic spectrum operations, public affairs, and psychological operations in the U.S. military found significant overlap that could inform the development of future Army doctrine in these areas. In clarifying the prevailing boundaries between these areas of interest, it is possible to predict the progression of these boundaries in the near future. The investigation also entailed developing new definitions that better capture this overlap for such concepts as information warfare. This is important because the Army is now studying ways to apply its cyber power and is reconsidering doctrinally defined areas that are integral to operations in cyberspace. It will also be critical for the Army to approach information operations with a plan to organize and, if possible, consolidate its operations in two realms: the psychological, which is focused on message content and people, and the technological, which is focused on content delivery and machines."--Page 4 of cover.
Like no other book before it, Global Information Warfare illustrates the relationships and interdependencies of business and national objectives, of companies and countries, and of their dependence on advances in technology. This book sheds light on the "Achilles heel" that these dependencies on advanced computing and information technologies creat
Information warfare is emerging as the new war fighting paradigm of the U.S. and many of its allies. This book is the first in the field to address communication electronic warfare (EW) systems in the context of information warfare. Authored by a recognized leading authority, the book includes a unique formulation of EW system performance and presents results of system simulations that have not appeared previously in any related literature. Essential reading for EW engineers and researchers working in defense, aerospace, and military capacities, the book explores the properties of information, the properties of information communication means, information theory, EW system architectures, and two operational simulations, one in Northeast Asia and the other in urban terrain.
In Leigh Armistead's second edited volume on warfare in the Information Age, the authors explore the hype over possibilities versus actuality in their analysis of Information Operations (IO) today. First, leaders must better understand the informational element of national power, and second, their sole focus on technology must expand to include IO's physical interconnectivity, content, and cognitive dimensions. Finally the authors urge the United States to use its enormous IO advantage to deal with complex national security issues beyond the Department of Defense, for example, in swaying global opinion and influencing other populations. Armistead and his colleagues set aside the hype and conjecture concerning IO, because its real potential is more powerful and comprehensive than currently appreciated. In a straightforward format they take practitioners on the path toward a smart and effective way of waging IO. While the original claims of "bloodless" wars or of computer hackers plunging North America into a new "dark age" of constant electric grid collapses quickly raised awareness of new threats and capabilities in the Information Age, these scenarios strain credulity and hamper our understanding of those threats and capabilities. This volume corrects this situation, grounding IO in the real world, and concentrates on its actual challenges, capabilities, and accomplishments. Information Warfare will be an indispensable guide and reference work for professionals and students in the fields of national security.
A no-nonsense treatment of information operations, this handbook makes clear what does and does not fall under information operations, how the military plans and executes such efforts, and what the role of IO ought to be in the war of ideas. Paul provides detailed accounts of the doctrine and practice of the five core information operations capabilities (psychological operations, military deception, operations security, electronic warfare, and computer network operations) and the three related capabilities (public affairs, civil-military operations, and military support to public diplomacy). The discussion of each capability includes historical examples, explanations of tools and forces available, and current challenges faced by that community. An appendix of selected excerpts from military doctrine ties the work firmly to the military theory behind information operations. Paul argues that contemporary IO's mixing of capabilities focused on information content with those focused on information systems conflates apples with the apple carts. This important study concludes that information operations would be better poised to contribute to the war of ideas if IO were reorganized, separating content capabilities from systems capabilities and separating the employment of black (deceptive or falsely attributed) information from white (wholly truthful and correctly attributed) information.
A comprehensive analysis of strategic information warfare waged via digital means as a distinct concern for the United States and its allies. In the "information age," information systems may serve as both weapons and targets. Although the media has paid a good deal of attention to information warfare, most treatments so far are overly broad and without analytical foundations. In this book Gregory Rattray offers a comprehensive analysis of strategic information warfare waged via digital means as a distinct concern for the United States and its allies. Rattray begins by analyzing salient features of information infrastructures and distinguishing strategic information warfare from other types of information-based competition, such as financial crime and economic espionage. He then establishes a conceptual framework for the successful conduct of strategic warfare in general, and of strategic information warfare in particular. Taking a historical perspective, he examines U.S. efforts to develop air bombardment capabilities in the period between World Wars I and II and compares them to U.S. efforts in the 1990s to develop the capability to conduct strategic information warfare. He concludes with recommendations for strengthening U.S. strategic information warfare defenses.
