Game Theoretic Analysis

Game Theoretic Analysis

Author: Petrosyan Leon A

Publisher: World Scientific

ISBN: 9789811202025

Category: Mathematics

Page: 620

View: 833

This is a collection of recent novel contributions in game theory from a group of prominent authors in the field. It covers Non-cooperative Games, Equilibrium Analysis, Cooperative Games and Axiomatic Values in static and dynamic contexts.Part 1: Non-cooperative Games and Equilibrium AnalysisIn game theory, a non-cooperative game is a game with competition between individual players and in which only self-enforcing (e.g. through credible threats) alliances (or competition between groups of players, called 'coalitions') are possible due to the absence of external means to enforce cooperative behavior (e.g. contract law), as opposed to cooperative games. In fact, non-cooperative games are the foundation for the development of cooperative games by acting as the status quo. Non-cooperative games are generally analysed through the framework of equilibrium, which tries to predict players' individual strategies and payoffs. Indeed, equilibrium analysis is the centre of non-cooperative games. This volume on non-cooperative games and equilibrium analysis contains a variety of non-cooperative games and non-cooperative game equilibria from prominent authors in the field.Part 2: Cooperative Games and Axiomatic ValuesIt is well known that non-cooperative behaviours, in general, would not lead to a Pareto optimal outcome. Highly undesirable outcomes (like the prisoner's dilemma) and even devastating results (like the tragedy of the commons) could appear when the involved parties only care about their individual interests in a non-cooperative situation. Cooperative games offer the possibility of obtaining socially optimal and group efficient solutions to decision problems involving strategic actions. In addition, axiomatic values serve as guidance for establishing cooperative solutions. This volume on cooperative games and axiomatic values presents a collection of cooperative games and axiomatic values from prominent authors in the field.

Game Theoretic Risk Analysis of Security Threats

Game Theoretic Risk Analysis of Security Threats

Author: Vicki M. Bier

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

ISBN: 9780387877679

Category: Technology & Engineering

Page: 242

View: 400

Game Theoretic Risk Analysis of Security Threats introduces reliability and risk analysis in the face of threats by intelligent agents. More specifically, game-theoretic models are developed for identifying optimal and/or equilibrium defense and attack strategies in systems of varying degrees of complexity. The book covers applications to networks, including problems in both telecommunications and transportation. However, the book’s primary focus is to integrate game theory and reliability methodologies into a set of techniques to predict, detect, diminish, and stop intentional attacks at targets that vary in complexity. In this book, Bier and Azaiez highlight work by researchers who combine reliability and risk analysis with game theory methods to create a set of functional tools that can be used to offset intentional, intelligent threats (including threats of terrorism and war). These tools will help to address problems of global security and facilitate more cost-effective defensive investments.

Game Theoretic Analysis of Congestion, Safety and Security

Game Theoretic Analysis of Congestion, Safety and Security

Author: Kjell Hausken

Publisher: Springer

ISBN: 9783319130095

Category: Technology & Engineering

Page: 310

View: 764

Maximizing reader insights into the roles of intelligent agents in networks, air traffic and emergency departments, this volume focuses on congestion in systems where safety and security are at stake, devoting special attention to applying game theoretic analysis of congestion to: protocols in wired and wireless networks; power generation, air transportation and emergency department overcrowding. Reviewing exhaustively the key recent research into the interactions between game theory, excessive crowding, and safety and security elements, this book establishes a new research angle by illustrating linkages between the different research approaches and serves to lay the foundations for subsequent analysis. Congestion (excessive crowding) is defined in this work as all kinds of flows; e.g., road/sea/air traffic, people, data, information, water, electricity, and organisms. Analysing systems where congestion occurs – which may be in parallel, series, interlinked, or interdependent, with flows one way or both ways – this book puts forward new congestion models, breaking new ground by introducing game theory and safety/security into proceedings. Addressing the multiple actors who may hold different concerns regarding system reliability; e.g. one or several terrorists, a government, various local or regional government agencies, or others with stakes for or against system reliability, this book describes how governments and authorities may have the tools to handle congestion, but that these tools need to be improved whilst additionally ensuring safety and security against various threats. This game-theoretic analysis sets this two volume book apart from the current congestion literature and ensures that the work will be of use to postgraduates, researchers, 3rd/4th-year undergraduates, policy makers, and practitioners.

Game Theoretic Analysis of Congestion, Safety and Security

Game Theoretic Analysis of Congestion, Safety and Security

Author: Kjell Hausken

Publisher: Springer

ISBN: 3319116738

Category: Technology & Engineering

Page: 220

View: 463

Maximizing reader insights into the interactions between game theory, excessive crowding and safety and security elements, this book establishes a new research angle by illustrating linkages between different research approaches and through laying the foundations for subsequent analysis. Congestion (excessive crowding) is defined in this work as all kinds of flows; e.g., road/sea/air traffic, people, data, information, water, electricity, and organisms. Analysing systems where congestion occurs – which may be in parallel, series, interlinked, or interdependent, with flows one way or both ways – this book puts forward new congestion models, breaking new ground by introducing game theory and safety/security into proceedings. Addressing the multiple actors who may hold different concerns regarding system reliability; e.g. one or several terrorists, a government, various local or regional government agencies, or others with stakes for or against system reliability, this book describes how governments and authorities may have the tools to handle congestion, but that these tools need to be improved whilst additionally ensuring safety and security against various threats. This game-theoretic analysis sets this book apart from the current congestion literature and ensures that the book will be of use to postgraduates, researchers, 3rd/4th-year undergraduates, policy makers, and practitioners.

Handbook on Game Theoretic Analysis

Handbook on Game Theoretic Analysis

Author: Leon A. Petrosyan

Publisher: World Scientific Publishing Company

ISBN: 9811202001

Category:

Page: 620

View: 391

This is a collection of recent novel contributions in game theory from a group of prominent authors in the field. It covers Non-cooperative Games, Equilibrium Analysis, Cooperative Games and Axiomatic Values in static and dynamic contexts. Part 1: Non-cooperative Games and Equilibrium Analysis In game theory, a non-cooperative game is a game with competition between individual players and in which only self-enforcing (e.g. through credible threats) alliances (or competition between groups of players, called "coalitions") are possible due to the absence of external means to enforce cooperative behavior (e.g. contract law), as opposed to cooperative games. In fact, non-cooperative games are the foundation for the development of cooperative games by acting as the status quo. Non-cooperative games are generally analysed through the framework of equilibrium, which tries to predict players' individual strategies and payoffs. Indeed, equilibrium analysis is the centre of non-cooperative games. This volume on non-cooperative games and equilibrium analysis contains a variety of non-cooperative games and non-cooperative game equilibria from prominent authors in the field. Part 2: Cooperative Games and Axiomatic Values It is well known that non-cooperative behaviours, in general, would not lead to a Pareto optimal outcome. Highly undesirable outcomes (like the prisoner's dilemma) and even devastating results (like the tragedy of the commons) could appear when the involved parties only care about their individual interests in a non-cooperative situation. Cooperative games offer the possibility of obtaining socially optimal and group efficient solutions to decision problems involving strategic actions. In addition, axiomatic values serve as guidance for establishing cooperative solutions. This volume on cooperative games and axiomatic values presents a collection of cooperative games and axiomatic values from prominent authors in the field.

Game Theory Topics

Game Theory Topics

Author: Evelyn C. Fink

Publisher: SAGE

ISBN: 0761910166

Category: Mathematics

Page: 84

View: 648

PLEASE UPDATE SAGE UK AND SAGE INDIA ADDRESSES ON IMPRINT PAGE.

Control and Game-Theoretic Models of the Environment

Control and Game-Theoretic Models of the Environment

Author: Jerzy Filar

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

ISBN: 9781461208419

Category: Mathematics

Page: 357

View: 885

This book collects some recent works on the application of dynamic game and control theory to the analysis of environmental problems. This collec tion of papers is not the outcome of a conference or of a workshop. It is rather the result of a careful screening from among a number of contribu tions that we have solicited across the world. In particular, we have been able to attract the work of some of the most prominent scholars in the field of dynamic analyses of the environment. Engineers, mathematicians and economists provide their views and analytical tools to better interpret the interactions between economic and environmental phenomena, thus achiev ing, through this interdisciplinary effort, new and interesting results. The goal of the book is more normative than descriptive. All papers include careful modelling of the dynamics of the main variables involved in the game between nature and economic agents and among economic agents themselves, as well-described in Vrieze's introductory chapter. Fur thermore, all papers use this careful modelling framework to provide policy prescriptions to the public agencies authorized to regulate emission dy namics. Several diverse problems are addressed: from global issues, such as the greenhouse effect or deforestation, to international ones, such as the management of fisheries, to local ones, for example, the control of effluent discharges. Moreover, pollution problems are not the only concern of this book.

Economy and Disability

Economy and Disability

Author: Akihiko Matsui

Publisher: Springer Nature

ISBN: 9789811376238

Category: Mathematics

Page: 236

View: 911

Society has developed so that it accommodates the needs of intertwined people, but a question arises as to which people have been accommodated. Has everyone been taken care of in an equal manner? If not, who has fallen into the gap between the institutions that are supposed to accommodate them? This book is a study of these issues of economy and disability using game theory, which has provided a means of analyzing various social phenomena. Part I provides actual cases related to economy and disability, with the stories based on interviews by the author. Part II is geared toward a game theoretic analysis. This book explains disability-related issues by game theory and innovates that theory by deeply contemplating the issues. It is not common that first-rate theorists manage to make their research relevant and applicable to the most pressing problems our society faces these days. This is the remarkable achievement of this book. Akihiko Matsui, an internationally recognized leader in economic theory, succeeds in bringing profound game theoretical insights to the questions of disability, the social norms relating to it, and the ethical and economic problems they raise. The book is a tour de force, brilliantly combining economic and sociology, mathematics and philosophy, to provide us a fresh look at the way we run modern societies. Itzahk Gilboa, Professor, Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel-Aviv University and Professor of Economics and Decision Sciences, HEC, Paris The present world faces a broad range of societal problems such as discrimination against minorities and conflicts between groups. The market mechanism may solve some of these dilemmas, but many others remain. This book targets various societal problems and provides game theoretical approaches to them, stressing the importance of social institutions including the market system and individual interactive attitudes to society. Aki Matsui’s splendid Economy and Disability is indispensable for students and scholars interested in social science, particularly in economic theory, and gives a better understanding of these phenomena and their potential cures. Mamoru Kaneko, Professor, Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University In this book, Aki Matsui is revealed to be a fully-fledged humanist in the guise of a game theoretician. He beautifully presents game-theoretical ideas while at the same time suggesting how society should relate to the disabled. This unique combination makes Economy and Disability—apart from anything else—a truly moving book. Ariel Rubinstein, Professor of Economics, Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel-Aviv University and Professor of Economics, New York University

Game-Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis

Game-Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis

Author: J.F. Mertens

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

ISBN: 0792330110

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 282

View: 966

JEAN-FRANQOIS MERTENS This book presents a systematic exposition of the use of game theoretic methods in general equilibrium analysis. Clearly the first such use was by Arrow and Debreu, with the "birth" of general equi librium theory itself, in using Nash's existence theorem (or a generalization) to prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium. But this use appeared possibly to be merely tech nical, borrowing some tools for proving a theorem. This book stresses the later contributions, were game theoretic concepts were used as such, to explain various aspects of the general equilibrium model. But clearly, each of those later approaches also provides per sea game theoretic proof of the existence of competitive equilibrium. Part A deals with the first such approach: the equality between the set of competitive equilibria of a perfectly competitive (i.e., every trader has negligible market power) economy and the core of the corresponding cooperative game.

Game-Theoretic Models of the Political Influence of Interest Groups

Game-Theoretic Models of the Political Influence of Interest Groups

Author: Randolph Sloof

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

ISBN: 9781475753073

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 262

View: 698

In this chapter the topic of this book is introduced. Section 1. 1 provides a brief and rather general motivation for the scientific project undertaken here. Interest groups are a very popular object of scientific inquiry, and they received already considerable research attention from scholars in political science, as well as from researchers in economics. Necessarily, then, this book adds to a literature which is already quite developed. A detailed positioning in this literature of the theoretical material presented in this monograph will be given in Chapter 2. This second chapter will also, by means of a review of the empirical literature, provide a more general overview of the issues deemed to be important when studying the influence of interest groups on public policy. The outline of the entire book is described in greater detail in Section 1. 2. As most issues involved are more easily presented in later chapters, this introductory chapter is kept brief. 1. 1 MOTIVATION Substantial political power is often attributed to interest groups. Examples abound in both the economics and political science literature, as well as in journalistic accounts and popular publications. On many occasions the authors express concerns about the negative impact of interest groups on the democratic quality of government. "The interests of a small group are served at the expense of the interests of the general public, the taxpayers!", is an often heard popular complaint.