In Law and Public Choice, Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey present a remarkably rich and accessible introduction to the driving principles of public choice. In this, the first systematic look at the implications of social choice for legal doctrine, Farber and Frickey carefully review both the empirical and theoretical literature about interest group influence and provide a nonmathematical introduction to formal models of legislative action. Ideal for course use, this volume offers a balanced and perceptive analysis and critique of an approach which, within limits, can illuminate the dynamics of government decision-making. “Law and Public Choice is a most valuable contribution to the burgeoning literature. It should be of great interest to lawyers, political scientists, and all others interested in issues at the intersection of government and law.”—Cass R. Sunstein, University of Chicago Law School
Public choice theory should be taken seriously--but not too seriously. In this thought-provoking book, Jerry Mashaw stakes out a middle ground between those who champion public choice theory (the application of the conventional methodology of economics to political science matters, also known as rational choice theory) and those who disparage it. He argues that in many cases public choice theory's reach has exceeded its grasp. In others, public choice insights have not been pursued far enough by those who are concerned with the operation and improvement of legal institutions. While Mashaw addresses perennial questions of constitutional law, legislative interpretation, administrative law, and the design of public institutions, he arrives at innovative conclusions. Countering the positions of key public choice theorists, Mashaw finds public choice approaches virtually useless as an aid to the interpretation of statutes, and he finds public choice arguments against delegating political decisions to administrators incoherent. But, using the tools of public choice analysts, he reverses the lawyers' conventional wisdom by arguing that substantive rationality review is not only legitimate but a lesser invasion of legislative prerogatives than much judicial interpretation of statutes. And, criticizing three decades of "law reform," Mashaw contends that pre-enforcement judicial review of agency rules has seriously undermined both governmental capacity and the rule of law.
This book provides an accessible introduction to the emerging field of behavioral public choice economics and the law. This field studies how public officials, lawmakers, and judges fall prey to their own biases and heuristics, and how constitutions and judicial doctrines can be structured to mitigate these cognitive shortcomings. Written lucidly in plain language, this book is invaluable to all students, scholars, and general readers interested in behavioral economics, law and economics, and political economy.
The first volume of this reference collection focuses on the economics of politics. The second and third volumes focus on constitutional political economy. The book focuses attention on a range of approaches to the subject that have emerged from differing backgrounds of political philosophy.
This book is designed with the problems of pedagogy in mind. The materials are arranged to assist students to appreciate the relationships underlying various administrative-law doctrines. The materials also are intended to reveal the historical origins of those doctrines and their developments over time. With this new edition, Administrative Law, Cases and Materials, continues to present the complex substance of administrative law in a format that is both intellectually satisfying and easily understandable. In addition to carefully examining current law, students will become familiar with the relevant historical perspectives so necessary to appreciate the dynamics of today's law. They will become familiar with the so-called progressive movement and its regulatory offspring, the independent agency, with the New Deal regulatory agenda, with the post-World War II consensus embodying the Administrative Procedure Act, with the problem of capture, with aggressive modes of judicial review in response, with the problem ossification of rule-making, and with an array of judicial reinterpretations of settled precedents. This focus on doctrinal coherence and historical background provides a rich intellectual experience.
The character of economic life] in a society is dependent upon, among 2 other things, its political-legal-economic institutional setting. Within that institutional structure, the individuals who comprise that society attempt to cooperate with one another to their mutual advantage so as to accommodate their joint utility-maximizing endeavors. In addition, these same individuals call upon certain societal institutions to adjust the con flicting claims of different individuals and groups. In this regard, a society is perceived as both a cooperative venture for mutual advantage where there are an identity of interests and, as well, an arena of conflict where there exists a mutual interdependence of conflicting claims or interests. The manner in which a society structures its political-legal-economic institutions 1) to enhance the scope of its cooperative endeavors and 2) to channel internal political-legal-economic conflicts toward resolution, shapes the character of economic life in that society. In contemplating the structure of its institutions intended to promote cooperation and channel conflict, a society confronts several issues. At the most general level an enduring issue is how a society both perceives and then ideologically transmits (perhaps teaches or rationalizes), inter nally and/or externally, its perceptions of so-called "cooperative en deavors" and "arenas of conflict." There can be no doubt that the resultant structure of a society's institutions will reflect that society's perception as to what cooperation entails and what conflict constitutes.
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice provides a comprehensive overview of the research in economics, political science, law, and sociology that has generated considerable insight into the politics of democratic and authoritarian systems as well as the influence of different institutional frameworks on incentives and outcomes. The result is an improved understanding of public policy, public finance, industrial organization, and macroeconomics as the combination of political and economic analysis shed light on how various interests compete both within a given rules of the games and, at times, to change the rules. These volumes include analytical surveys, syntheses, and general overviews of the many subfields of public choice focusing on interesting, important, and at times contentious issues. Throughout the focus is on enhancing understanding how political and economic systems act and interact, and how they might be improved. Both volumes combine methodological analysis with substantive overviews of key topics. This second volume examines constitutional political economy and also various applications, including public policy, international relations, and the study of history, as well as methodological and measurement issues. Throughout both volumes important analytical concepts and tools are discussed, including their application to substantive topics. Readers will gain increased understanding of rational choice and its implications for collective action; various explanations of voting, including economic and expressive; the role of taxation and finance in government dynamics; how trust and persuasion influence political outcomes; and how revolution, coups, and authoritarianism can be explained by the same set of analytical tools as enhance understanding of the various forms of democracy.
The Economics of Lawmaking explores the relative advantages and limits of alternative sources of law. Professors Francesco Parisi and Vincy Fon view the sources of law through a law and economics lens, and consider the important issue of institutional design in lawmaking. They consider the respective advantages and proper scope of application of four fundamental sources of law: legislation, judge-made law, customary law, and international law. The defining features of these four sources of law are examined using the formal methods of public choice theory: lawmaking through legislation; lawmaking through adjudication; lawmaking through practice; and lawmaking through agreement. This book begins by examining the sources of law dependent on collective political decision-making, such as legislation. Multiple issues are considered, such as optimal specificity of law, optimal timing of legal intervention and optimal territorial scope of law, and include a thorough discussion on the sources of law derived from judges' decisions, such as common law. Parisi and Fon provide an extensive study on the roles of litigation and judicial path-dependence on judge-made law, biases in the evolution of legal remedies through litigation, and the effect of alternative doctrines of legal precedent, such as stare decisis and jurisprudence constante. They also consider the customary sources of law, with special attention on the mechanisms that determine their emergence and evolution, and explore sources of law derived from international treaties and conventions. The Economics of Lawmaking is the first systematic law and economics treatment of this field and will shed new light on the process of lawmaking.
Economic analysis of law: an overview -- Behavioral studies -- An overview of behavioral law and economics -- Normative implications -- Behavioral insights and basic features of the law -- Property law -- Contract law -- Consumer contracts -- Tort law -- Commercial law -- Administrative, constitutional, and international law -- Criminal law and enforcement -- Tax law and redistribution -- Litigants' behavior -- Judicial decision-making -- Evidence law
